URL: http://jesus.com.au/html/page/allow, Accessed: Fri, 08 Aug 2008 10:43:04 +1000, Copyright: ©2000-07, Nigel Chapman
On the previous page, 'Defining the Problem of Evil', we made a few important points: Suffering only offers a possible objection to God’s existence when it is a demonstrable evil, and thus something a morally good being ought to prevent, insofar as that being is able. The problem of evil argues that an all-good and all-powerful being cannot coexist with all the evil that we see. If such a being existed, he or she would have prevented it.
It is customary to separate evil into two categories: moral and natural evil. Moral evil is that produced by our freedom, and natural evil is that which ‘just happens’. The obvious point here is that you can’t blame all the evil of the world on free will: free will does not cause natural disasters, for example.
The race is not to the swift
or the battle to the strong,
nor does food come to the wise
or wealth to the brilliant
or favor to the learned;
but time and chance happen to them all.
Moreover, no man knows when his hour will come.
As fish are caught in a cruel net,
or birds are taken in a snare,
so men are trapped by evil times
that fall unexpectedly upon them.
Ecclesiastes 9:11-12, NIV
It is, however, a mistake to say that moral evil is our fault and natural evil is God’s fault, without some further qualification.
Remembering that God is transcendent, and specifically eternal, it follows that he would have known in advance what natural AND moral evil would occur throughout the course of human history. The decision to create means that the universe has been in some sense pre-approved, and that both the perversity of human evil and the pointlessness of natural evil, as they have actually occurred, have been judged worthwhile.
A ‘soft response’ to the question of evil and suffering is purely defensive; it strives to show that some worthwhile purpose may exist, or at least that it is not demonstrably impossible. This neither very difficult nor, for that matter, very impressive — it boils down to the old “You can’t prove X”, “Yeah, well you can't prove Not-X” (repeat indefinitely). A ‘hard’ response will need to step out and to argue what that purpose actually is.
It is usually the case in theology that whatever seems at the outset to be an anomaly is actually the key to the whole question. Thus we'll focus mainly on the problem of natural evil here in asking why does God allow evil of any kind.
No, this isn't the old, turn-the-question-around trick — there is a point to it. Who of us prevents all of the evil that we possibly might? It isn’t likely that any of us do. Why not?
Cases which are not analogous to God (not enough power, don't know what's best, don’t care, aren’t good), cases which are (respect other’s freedom, knows people need to learn for themselves, develop wisdom and responsibility, the short-term inconvenience is valuable experience, etc).
Can we prevent moral () or natural evil? (subdue the earth?) — the case of having kids.
Natural evil forces the issue of responsibility. The problem bounces back on us. If we maintain that a morally good being is obliged to prevent all the evil that they are able to, it is immediately obvious that all the moral evil can be stopped and most of the natural evil neutralized if we as humanity were to choose that.
[ in progress ]
Free will, soul making, the greater good.
These all assume that there are limitations on what is possible for God... the free will limits his sovereignty, that soul making requires conditions of adversity and can be made in no other way, or that some greater goods are incompatible with other, lesser, goods.
What then is possible for a being of unlimited knowledge and power?
Standard pitch on logical possibility being no limitation to power or intelligence, leading into the two main options...